Mali by Beek, W.E.A. van & Fofana, M.
Mali
The général pohtical picture was one of a calm, uneventfùl year, charactensed by political
consensus on the one hand and ecological problems on thé other. Both thé cabinet and thé
National Assembly were run on the basis of consensus rather than as an arena for oppos-
ing parties, although there was pro forma représentation of thé opposition m ail cabinet
councils. Though Président Touré was able to keep the political parties united and relatively
sidelined, thé first signs of a political shift were apparent in 2004, as thé parties began to
position themselves for thé 2007 élections, and some protests occurred. The major prob-
lems m the country were of an ecological nature, namely thé locust plague and a poor rainy
season.
Domestic Politics
Internai politics remamed charactensed by Mali's pecuhar features: this is a multiparty state
in which political parties play little or no rôle. The current président, Amadou Toumam
Touré, usually called ATT, came into office without any party affiliation as a resuit of a pop-
ulär multiparty 'Mouvement de Soutien' for his nomination m 2002. His prime minister,
Ahmed Mohamed Ag Hamani, also had no party affiliation, but thé cabinet was made up
of représentatives of thé major parties, such as RPM ('Rassemblement Populaire du Mali')
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and Adema ('Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice', the party of the former presi-
dent Konaré, now head of the AU Commission).
On 3 May, Touré appointed a new cabinet. Ousmane Issoufi Maïga, formerly minister
of transport, became thé new prime minister, many former ministers were reshuffled to new
departments, while four new ministers were appointed, for a total of 28. The most impor-
tant new appointments were Moctar Wanna, former career diplomat, to foreign affaire,
Sadio Gassama, former army chief-of-staff, to interior security, and the economist Abubacar
Traoré to finance. Culture, an important Malian export product, remained in the hands of
movie director Cheick Oumar Sissoko, who is also president of the minoriry 'Parti pour la
Solidarité Africaine'.
The overall impression was that Touré wanted more dynamism in his cabinet ("un gou-
vernement de terrain"). A more précise motive is difficult to pinpoint, though thé old prime
minister seemed to be ailing and had asked to be released. On the other hand, consensus pol-
itics in Mali, which had given Touré's govemment a long political honeymoon, seemed to
be ending and some political parties started flexing their muscles for thé 2007 élections.
Positions crystallised and some protests began. Moreover, thé non-partisan political
movement that brought ATT to power was considering turning into a formai political party,
but a sizeable number of politicians preferred to keep it a ground-swell movement. Indeed,
in the past some of thé parties had emerged in this way: Adema, for example, was originally
a mass movement to remove Moussa Traoré in thé early 1990s. Gradually, many of the 2002
élection promises were seen to be failing and some changes were expected. However,
throughout 2004 thé political opposition was mute and even the trade unions decided not
to take overt action, despite arrears in payments and lack of job opportunities. Union lead-
ers declared that Mali was best served by unity in govemment and a high level of trust in
the president.
Whatever the reasons for the cabinet reshuffle, if there were internai divisions within the
cabinet, they remained bidden: the consensus culture of Mali's governance precluded pub-
liciry leaks. This was in keeping with the way ATT has continued Mali's policy since the
advent of électoral democracy, in order to have stability and calm in the country. He also
demands flexibility and modesty from leading officials. One major issue was the start of a
major campaign against corruption, for which a 'Cellule d'Appui aux Structures de
Controle de l'Administration' (CASCA) was inaugurated with the aim of being effective
in 2005, plus thé appointaient on l April of a général national accountant (Sid Sosso Diara).
One stimulus was the scandal over the embezzlement of CFAfr 2.6 bn (€ 4 m) in the depart-
ments of economy and finance. However, despite govemment rhetoric, actions were few
and very slow, and it is debatable whether the govemment will have either the power or the
stamina to fight this internai battle.
Some hitches in peace and stability proved to be minor ripples in the political pond. A
persistent issue has been unrest among students at Mali's secondary and tertiary éducation
















by thé end of thé year protests had become more focused. Irked by thé commercialisation
of éducation, non-payment of bursaries, infighting among faculty and inadéquate educa-
tional facilities, and triggered by rivalries between students of different schools, students
rosé in a séries of protests against school establishments, especially thé faculty of économie
and juridical sciences. On 30 November, this resulted in the death of one student (Mamadou
Traoré, or 'Papou') that shook the country. His death was still under investigation at the end
of thé year, when nine students, three policemen and a government officiai were detained
for questioning. The matter was aggravated by the later deaths of a girl and a boy, Though
largely unrelated to the protest marches, they made for a nationwide scandal. Problems in
éducation will probably remain on the political agenda in the next years of ATT's mandate,
especially at the recently created, severely understaffed and under-equipped University of
Bamako. Compared to the educational unrest, other protests had little effect. Protests by
butchers (24 April) and journalists (28 August) proceeded more smoothly, as did one by
Malian artists against illegal copying of their work (21 June). The freeing of the hostages
from Qatar who had been in the hands of northern rebels was a boost for the government.
In February, the new élection committee was appointed and installed and on 30 May élec-
tions were held in all 703 communes in Mali for the second time, and went quietly and well,
with a record 43% voter turnout (5.6 m Malians voted). The winner was the former ruling
party, Adema, with 28%, URD ('Union Rassemblement Démocratique') trailing with
14%andRPMwith 13%. Some alliances of smaller parties followed with ll%andacoali-
tion of individuals with 9%. Other parties, historically important in the démocratisation
process, like the CNID ('Congrès National d'Initiative Démocratique') and BDIA ('Bloc
pour la Démocratie et l'Intégration Africaine') fared less well. Observers were satisfied with
the proceedings and generally concluded that démocratisation processes in Mali were well
under way. However, problems remained, such as thé weak administration of justice and
widespread and deeply rooted corruption.
The problems in thé north of Mali hâve abated but seemed not to have been resolved,
though thé banditry in thé empty north seemed to hâve no political overtones any longer.
One incident occurred on 2 July, when a Malian Red Cross mission in thé north was
attacked and robbed of their vehicle by bandits. A more serious clash was between Arab
and Kounta in eastern Mali, near Gao, resulting in 13 people being killed in September.
Both groups hâve longstandmg historical links to thé area, having lived relatively peace-
fully under Kounta chieftaincy for centuries. However, décentralisation measures generaled
compétition over access to the few resources of the région, both ecological - mainly water-
holes - and political, namely control of the few trans-Saharan roads. In 2002 and 2003, there
had already been clashes, but not on this scale. This clash seemed related to thé Islamic fun-
damentalist group that kidnapped a party of European tourists in south Algeria in 2003,
released them in August, and then sought refuge m thé mountains of eastem Mali. As a con-
séquence, thé US sent military instructors to train thé Malian army in anti-terrorist warfare
techniques in Gao, providing them with ail-terrain vehicles and désert warfare equipment,
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as part of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, now known as Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative
(TSCTI). This issue was, of course, most vividly publicised when two stages of the Paris-
Dakar rally, held trom 1-16 January, were cancelled because of gang activity in northera





The largest external political problem for Mali was the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Since over
a million Malians lived in Côte d'Ivoire, the ongoing conflict heavily impacted the Malian
economy. At the end of March, the Ivonan army killed several civilians in the rebel-held
north, which resulted in another wave of Malians living in that area returning to Mali. With
them came an unspecified number of Ivorian 'rebels', who agreed, however, not to use Mali
as a rallying point for the armed straggle. Several high-level conferences were held during
2004 (27 July in Bamako, 26 November in Ouagadougou and 15 December in Abuja) to
address the issue. There were other international contacts, e.g., on 15-16 May at a confer-
ence in Bamako with the other countries in West Africa plus the Maghrib countries united
under the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharans States), namely Tunisia, Libya,
Morocco, Gambia and Mauritania as well as Egypt, to address joint problems in the area,
such as civil war, drought, AIDS, the world market for cotton and unemployment. On 26
and 27 April the countries bordering the Niger River conferred in Paris on the management
of this crucial waterway and the development of inland fisheries on the river, just as they
had done on the problems of cotton production and marketing on 19 February m Bamako,
Most external political efforts were directed at generating aid fonds m vanous ways.
Loans were obtained from the World Bank, the Islamic Bank, and the Bank of West Afhca
and the Sahel-Sudan Bank for various purposes, such as road construction, HIV/AIDS cam-
paigns, security and water management. Deals with, among others, China, the US, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Kuwait secured additional funds, plus the cancellation of some
Mali debts (by China), and in the latter part of the year funds from various sources were
secured to combat the locust plague.
Mali was visited by several foreign dignitaries, mostly from the sub-region, such as the
représentatives of the Francophone states (22 February); the president of Gambia (21-23
March); the premier of Morocco (l 1-12 April); the finance ministers of Kuwait (28 June)
and of Canada (19 August); a Chinese délégation (15-17 November); and the premier of
Haiti (28 November). President Touré himself was quite active in visiting other countries:
Egypt (26-28 January); Libya (26-28 February and 18-21 August); Ghana ( 19-20 March);
Guinea (20-21 May); Mozambique (23-24 May); Burkina Faso (21-22 June, 8-9
September, 26-27 November); China (15-19 July); Gambia (22-23 July); Libya (18-28
August); and Niger (11-12 October). On the international scène the former président
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Konaré generaled visibility for Mali as président of thé AU; in October, he published an
autobiography entitled "Alpha Oumar Konaré, an African from Mali."
Socioeconomic Developments
Just as in 1998, Mali was plagued by locusts in 2004. The previous two years had seen a
moderate invasion of locusts, with a recrudescence in some places, especially thé weiter
spots in north and central Mali, thé Mopti région. New swarms bred during the early months
of 2004, on thé border with Mauritania and Niger as well, and further east into Chad. The
FAO at the start of 2004 tried mainly to preclude a locust migration from the northern Sahel
into the northwest, to prevent further breeding in the Maghrib. However, tbis had limited
success. Despite massive activity in the north (6 million hectares treated with insecticides),
early spring saw several swarms mature and migrate towards Mali, where the wet season
produced further swarms.
Estimâtes of erop loss ranged from one-third to (more probably) one-fifth of the national
harvest (750,000 tonnes out of the expected roughly three million tonnes). However, later
reports noted that the loss of the projected harvest was at least partly due to failing rains at
the end of the season. President Touré, who toured the afflicted areas (the régions of
Timbuktu, Mopti and Kayes in particular) assured the stricken population that famine was
not expected and that all food would be shared ("as long as Sikasso has only one tuber of
manioc, Mali will share it"). The reason for this assurance was that thé main food produc-
ing area, the 'rice granary' of the Niger basin and the inner delta, were largely spared
through joint international efforts, even though the southern part of the delta was affected.
Algeria in particular, both through direct involvement and by leading the other Maghrib
countries, spearheaded actual help in money, equipment and insecticides. More interna-
tional aid followed from the EU and the US. The efficacy of locust extermination was,
however, hamperedby lack of equipment on the ground, outdated chemicals, lack of spray-
ing aéroplanes and insufficient knowledge about locust extermination among both cadres
and the local population. Also, the long-term risk of the chemicals for the environment and
the immédiate risk of the reuse of empty chemical vats by locals called for a sustained cam-
paign. An early waming System was also re-established.
At year's end, the Asian tsunami diverted international attention from the locust plague,
but also produced a wave of solidarity in the country, uniting expatriate Malians (estimated
at 25% of the population) in helping their kin. Other countries were affected as well, such
as Mauritania, but Mali produces 80% of what it consumes while Mauritania relies much
more on imported food. Food distribution began to get under way in November 2004. At
least 10% of all villages were severely afflicted and needed aid, and distribution was
monopolised by the presidential office, which distributed the free food handouts. This was
interpreted by some as a way to boost the president's standing among the grassroots and to
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position himself for the new élections, but it also reflected genuine concern in the central
office (in August the president handed over one month's salary to the anti-locust campaign
and urged his ministers to do the same) and did not seem to have harmed the efficiency of
the distributions. If some areas remained outside the distribution programmes, as seemed
the case, this was not different from earlier distributions.
A perennial ecological problem manifested itself earlier than usual, due to the locust
plague. The hard hit north sent lts cattle south sooner than usual. The usual arrangement is
that cattle return south when the rice and millet harvest is well under way, with the major
crossing of the Niger by the herds usually well orchestrated. In 2004, the transhumance
areas were depleted well before that date, and the herds had to search for food south of the
Niger before the harvest. This resulted in tensions with resident farmers, which in some
places erupted into open conflict, though without casualties. The usual exodus of seasonal
labour from the stricken areas also started earlier this year and more young people moved
to the cities in search of gainful employment. There, they were thwarted by the loss of the
Ivorian labour market, and more young farmers from the Niger bend moved into Bamako,
south Mali and the cities of Ghana.
Despite the major attention on the locust plague, dnraght also remained on the politi-
cal agenda. In August, government imposed a genera! ban on tree felling throughout Mali,
and announced some initiatives for tree planting. The 10% of tree cover is under pressure
from commercial logging and charcoal production. Given the status of the water and forests
départaient, however, it is debatable whether this measure will have the efiect intended. The
départaient is seen by the majority of the rural population as a police force that pénalises
locals for any use of wood. Thus, the law on rural sales of wood, issued at the start of 2004,
which aims at a more balanced use of fuel and construction wood and tries to regulate com-
mercial wood extraction, probably will not have the effect intended. At the very beginning
of the year, in January, the government promised to install 9,600 new village pumps dur-
ing the next decade.
Mali in 2004 continued to suffer from its usual socioeconomic problems, but some
improvement was discernible. Illiteracy declined slowly, to 71% (73% in 2002, 77% in
1997 and 81% in 1990). School enrolment rose to 61% in 2000 (41% in 1995, 25% in
1985). The national debt showed some réduction - $ 2,803 m in 2002 against $ 2,903 m
in 1993 - though in 2002, 73% of the population still had less than $ l per day in income.
There were sévère healtfe-related problems. Average life expectancy declined from 45
years (1990) to 41 years in 2002. Infant mortality stands at 152 per 1,000, child mortality
at 231 per 1,000, and matemal mortality at 630 per 100,000. The rising HIV infection
rate - still severely underreported in 2001 at 1.7% - the rising incidence of malaria (still
the largest killer in Mali) and an outbreak of cholera underscored the health vulnerabüity
of the Malian population. Mali participated in a Chinese project to field-test their new
Amonquinoline anti-malaria drug, and the results seemed promising. World demand for this
new drug rose exponentially in 2004 and the Chinese will probably not be able to keep up
Mali • 1 1 7
icern in the central
iti-locust campaign
îd the efficiency of
ammes, as seemed
, due to the locust
.ual arrangement is
'ay, with the major
the transhumance
irfoodsouthofthe
:rs, which in some
sxodus of seasonal
ung people moved
i by the loss of the
wed into Bamako,
ined on the politi-
; throughout Mali,
• is under pressure
: water and forests
ffect intended. The
>rce that pénalises
t the start of 2004,




, in 2002, 77% in
in 1995, 25% in
igainst $ 2,903 m








« able to keep up
with demand. Furthermore, the drug is still quite expensive for Mali. Cholera resulted in
over 100 deaths at the end of 2003 and broke out again in the western part of the country
in February and March 2004. In May, the région of Tla, 350 kilomètres north of Bamako,
reported 21 cholera victims. After the onset of the rainy season, no new cases were
reported, but it is unlikely that the epidemie was fully over. Mali participated in a genera!
West African vaccination campaign against poliomyelitis, which started at 8 October.
The government initiated a campaign against female circumcision, still a reality for the
overwhelming majority of Malian women. In announcing the campaign, the government
stressed that the practice was not Islamic: it argued that the custom was strongest where
Islam was weakest. However, the incidence (91%!) that seems to hold for most parts of
Mali. Of course, as has been stressed extensively in Islamic discourse, the observation that
circumcision is not Quranic is correct. Indeed, the campaign would appear to be a soft seil
to spare the evident sensibilities on the issue. It seemed more a donor issue than an inter-
nai Malian problem and the upcoming élections will probably force the government to soft-
pedal this issue. Yet Mali did aim to play a major rôle in African Islam, and held a large
conference on Sufism in Bamako (17-22 December).
Tourism was on the rise in 2004, as it was during the last decades. In the previous two
decades, at least according to government statistics, the number of tourists rose from 35,000
to 150,000 per year. The government, together with several private partners, stimulated a
widening of the tourist appeal. Though the Dogon country remained the main attraction, the
implications of this tourist situation were increasingly realised. Government, the travel
industry and travel agents, both international and Malian, became concerned about the
impact of tourism on the Dogon area, realising that authenticity and mass tourism are not
compatible. Measures to broaden the attraction of Mali tourism were discussed. The
région of Timbuktu was singled out as a tourist development area; both the visits by the Aga
Khan and Chirac at the end of 2003 and the new airports in Mopti (developed for the 'Coupe
Afrique des Nations', the continental football championship) and Timbuktu were a stimu-
lus. The latter airport featured as a projected direct air link between the US and Timbuktu,
which authorities thought would not only increase tourism to that désert city, but also to the
rest of Mali. The American fascination with Timbuktu has a long history, just as the city is
the symbol for the ultimate foreign expérience, but in this case a military interest was
assumed by many commentators. The struggle against international terrorism has brought
the Sahara région into focus as a zone of terrorist recruitment, and, as mentioned above,
American military advisers assist Malian regulär troops in désert tactics and anti-terrorist
campaigns.
Malian tourism received additional international récognition in 2004. UNESCO put var-
lous buildings of Malian culture on the World Cultural Héritage list, such as the Askia tomb
in Gao (15th Century), and several objects in Timbuktu, for example, the mosques of
Djingarey-Ber, Sidi Yéhya and Sankoré. These, together with the famous tourist destina-
tions of Djenné and the Dogon country, which were put on this list in 1986, means that Mali
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is high on the world cultural agenda. The spécifie singling out of Timbuktu and Gao might
help to develop a tourist infrastructure in thé désert fringes. Also, Timbuktu saw a large store
of manuscripts unearthed in August, a major find in thé study of thé history of Mali. The
intellectuals of Mali, together with thé diaspora Malians, united in their efforts to promote
thé safekeeping of their cultural héritage. The government restored thé mosque of Shehu
Amadou at Hamdallaye, thé now deserted capital of thé former Macina emirate, and inau-
gurated thé building, which had to be rebuilt from scratch, on 11 June 2004.
Malian culture was exported in 2004 as well: several troupes of musicians, mask
dancers, griots and artisans toured Europe and America. However, the high point of
Mali's culture was the qualification of its football team for the Olympic games m Athens,
and thé fact that thé team made it ail thé way to thé quarter finals, where it was elimmated
by Italy.
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